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NOTES AND COMMENT
Automobiles: Driver and Guest: Negligence: Ordinary Care.
In Schmidt v. Leuthener, - Wis. -, 227 N.W. 17, there were two
separate actions brought by two plaintiffs, Schmidt and Waschak, to re-
cover damages for personal injuries received while passengers in an
automobile driven by one Leuthener. The two actions were consoli-
dated, and one verdict rendered in both cases.
Leuthener was traveling by automobile from Pittsburgh to Milwau-
kee accompanied by Schmidt and Waschak as guests. Schmidt occu-
pied the rear seat, Waschak sat beside the driver. At the time in
question there were no other automobiles on the highway except a
truck which was several blocks ahead, and which the defendant be-
lieved to be moving in the same direction. When the defendant came
within fifteen or twenty feet of the truck, he realized that it was stand-
ing still; he then quickly turned to avoid hitting the truck, but it was
too late, and a collision resulted. The defendant could have passed the
truck without interference had he turned seasonably. Leuthener's car
was traveling ten miles per hour when the accident occured.
About ten or fifteen minutes before the collision Waschak had rested
his head on the seat and tried to sleep. Schmidt was reading a news-
paper which he had folded to a narrow strip. He testified that he had
seen the truck when they were about one-half mile back, but had said
nothing to Leuthener about it. Both passengers said nothing to the
defendant about his manner of driving; in fact, they were satisfied with
the way in which the automobile was being operated; and did nothing
to distract the driver when approaching the truck.
Counsel for the defendant contended that the guests had failed to
exercise reasonable care for their own safety and that they were guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The jury decided that
the plaintiffs were not guilty of contributory negligence. The court
affirmed the judgment in both cases.
The case briefly discusses an instruction with reference to the duty
which a driver owes to a guest. The law required the driver to exer-
cise reasonable care for the protection of his guest; that is, the driver
owes "the duty of exercising ordinary care, which is that degree of
care which an ordinary, prudent person would exercise under like or
similar circumstances." See Vogel v. Otto, 182 Wis. 1 at 6, 195 N.W.
859. But the fact that the guest does not have charge of the automobile
does not absolve him from exercising reasonable care for his own
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safety. See Belongy v. Kewaunee, G.B.&W.R. Co., 184 Wis. 374, 199
N.W. 384; Glick v. Baer, 186 Wis. 268, 201 N.W. 752.
The trial court in its effort to make the average juror understand
the difference between the "duty of the driver to exercise ordinary
care" and the "want of ordinary care" has in some instances used
words in the charge to the jury which give rise to error because it has
been implied that ordinary care is divided into various degrees. See
Kausch v. Chicago and M.E.R. Co., 176 Wis. 21, 28; 186 N.W. 257, 260.
Thus in Gherke v. Cohran, - Wis. -, 222 N.W. 304, it was declared
that the use of the expression that if the driver failed to exercise ordin-
ary care "in the slightest degree" in instructing the jury is objectionable.
But in Sommerfield v. Flury, - Wis. -, 223 N.W. 408, 411, the court
suggests that the duty which the driver of a car owes to his occupant is
that of licensor and licensee; and then implies that "this calls for the
slightest degree of care....." In the light of the language used in Som-
merfield v. Flury, supra, the court in Grandhagen v. Grandhagen, -
Wis. -, 225 N.W. 935, criticizes the trial court's instruction to the jury
"that the owner or driver of an automobile upon the public highways
owes to a gratuitous guest the duty of exercising ordinary care to avoid
personal injury to him." Obviously, the law does not impose so great a
burden upon the driver, Grandhagen v. Grandhagen, - Wis._-, 225
N.W. 935, 937. It is almost equally as obvious that some confusion has
arisen as to the relationship between host and guest due to the difficulty
of defining the exact duty owed by host to guest and by guest to the
driver.
In Prideaux v. City of Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513, where the plain-
tiff, as the guest of the driver of a carriage was suing for injuries sus-
tained due to a defect in the highway, it was held that plaintiff's action
could not be maintained because the negligence of the driver of the
carriage would be imputed to her as contributory negligence on her part.
The doctrine that the driver is the agent of the occupant of a vehicle
and his negligence is imputed to the occupant was the law in Wisconsin
for nearly half a century (1878-1921) and was followed in many de-
cisions (See cases cited in Reiter v. Grober, 173 Wis. 493 at 496, 181
N.W. 739 at 740.) In Kuchler v. The Milwaukee E. R. and L. Co., 157
Wis. 107, 146 N.W. 1032, the parents of a boy of ten who was riding
in a carriage with his grandfather, were unable to recover for the boy's
death resulting from a collision with a street car, because the negligence
of the grandfather made the boy also guilty of negligence.
That rule was changed by the important case of Reiter v. Grober,
supra, which held that the negligence of the driver of a private vehicle
should not be imputed to an occupant who was not engaged in a joint
enterprise with and exercised no control over the driver. In Brubaker
v. Iowa County, 174 Wis. 574, 183 N.W. 690, the court followed the
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rule asserted in Reiter v. Grober, and extended the doctrine so as to
hold-as it had been held in numerous cases outside its own jurisdic-
tion-that a mere marital relationship did not make the wife chargeable
with the contributory negligence of the husband. The principle had
previously been followed that one who stands in a blood or marriage
relationship to the driver has the negligence of the driver imputed to
him. (See cases cited in Reiter v. Grober, 173 Wis. 493, at 496.)
In Oppenheim v. Barkin, 262 Mass. 281, 159 N E 628, cited in
Schmidt v. Leuthener, supra, it was held that a guest who was asleep
in the rear seat of ari automobile cannot recover for injuries received
notwithstanding that the driver was guilty of gross negligence, because
the guest had failed to look after his own safety and was therefore
guilty of contributory negligence. The decision, however, is not given
much weight by the Wisconsin court. It concludes that the fact that
each plaintiff was asleep had no casual connection with the collision.
Previous declarations of our Supreme Court, viewed apart from the
set of facts upon which they rest, would tend to indicate that the acts
of the two plaintiffs or their failure to act in the case of Schmidt v.
Leuthener would make them guilty of contributory negligence. For
example, it has been declared that the guest is bound to exercise due
care for his own safety in the matter of maintaining a lookout and must
give some heed to his own safety. See Howe v. Corey, 172 Wis. 537,
179 N.W. 791; Glick v. Baer, 186 Wis. 268, 201 N.W. 752; Krause v.
Hall, 195 Wis. 565, 217 N.W. 290.
The relationship between guest and host as to the exercise of ordi-
nary care could reasonably be treated as a question of cause and effect.
The determination of the question depends upon the circumstances in-
volved in each separate case. When the court in Schmidt v. Leuthener
makes causal connection between the alleged negligent acts and the
collision the test as to negligence, it expresses a proposition of law that
does not appear in the early host and guest cases and which doubtless
will serve as a safe guide in the judicious disposition of future host and
guest cases.
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Contracts: Master and Servant: Advancement of Funds.
In rendering its decision in the recent case of Shaler Umbrella Co. v.
Blow, 227 N.W. 1, the Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted a ques-
tion it had never before directly considered. Consequently the doc-
trine laid down is based largely on modem reasoning and the rulings of
foreign courts.
The question before the court was, whether an agent employed on
